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WEST VIBGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
APPLICATION OF THE RuLE rAGAINST PERPETUITIES TO OPTIONS
TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE.-The Rule against Perpetuities is said
to be a rule of property, and has not reference to the law of con-
tracts.1 Yet it has been decided that an option to purchase real
estate which might be exercised beyond the period allowed by the
Rule violates it. 2  The question then arises, What interests in real
estate does an option to purchase it create?
An option is a contract between a party called an optionor and
another called an optionee, whereby the optionor, for a considera-
tion paid him, promises to hold open for a stated length of time
an offer to sell to the optionee a .named thing at a named price.3
Such a contract, strictly speaking, gives the optionee merely a
right to have the offer kept open the stipulated length of time,4
and gives no interest whatever in the land itself.5 It is not a con-
tract for the sale of land, but is a contract to keep open an offer.
When the offer is accepted, a new contract comes into being, and
this latter contract does transfer to the former optionee an interest
in the real estate to which it relates." It is then no longer an op-
See London & Southwestern Ry. Co. -v. Gomm. 20 Ch. D. 562, 575. See also
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3 ed. §H 273a, 275, 329.
2 London etc., Ry. Co. v. Gomm, supra; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362. 32 N. B.
352; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 343, 92 AtI. 312; Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193,
85 S. E. 170; Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 566 S. E. 524. Contra, Hol-
lander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442. See Blakeman v.
Miller, 3 6 Cal. 138, 68 Pac. 587; Bauer v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 209 Ill. 316, 70
N. E. 634; Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 5 S. E. 890. See also GRAY, RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§ 33Cb, 330c;KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 664;
JAMES, OPTION CONTRACTS, §§ 219, 220. In Starcher Bros. v. Duty the court said
that, since the contract infring.d the Rule against Perpetuities, it was void from
the beginning. If this is true, could not the optionee recover back the considera-
tion paid the optionor on the -'oid contract?
3 Hanley v. watterson, 39 W. Va. 214, 19 S. E. 536; John v. Elkins, 63 W.
Va. 158, 59 S. E. 961; Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 I1. 469, 82 N. B. 654.
See JAFs, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 101.
& John v. Elkins, supra; Fulton v. Messenger, 61 W. Va. 477, 56 S. E. 830;
Hartman v. Selling, 192 Pac 408 (Cal. 1920) ; Rease v. Kittle, 56 W. Va. 269, 49
S. E. 150. See JAM.ES, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 502; 21 L. R. A."127.
5 Reese V. Kittle, s&tpra; Pollock v. Brookover, 60 W. Va. 75, 53 S. E. 795;
John v. Elkins, sul;ra; Standford v. Thompson, 135 Fed. 991, 68 C. C. A. 425;
Stearns v. Goad, 111 Va. 834, 69 S. E. 1101; Sheeby v. Scott.. 128 Ia. 551, 104 N.
W. 1139. See JAMPS, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 102; 57 L. It. A. 651. It Is stated
by sorre courts that an option contract gives the optionee a contingent interest.
See Worthing Corporation v. Heather, [1906) 2 Ch. 532, 536. And this view is
apparently approved by some eminent writers on the subject. See GRAY, RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §330; KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 665; 18
HAIYv. L. Bli 379. See also Prof. John 1R. Rood, "Options and the Rule Against
Perpetuities." 23 C. & Comr. 835.
Donnally v. Parker, 5 W. Va. 301; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed. 498, See JAMS,
OPTION CONTRACTS, § 301 n. 1. And see 39 CYc. 1243, 1302. As equitable own-
er of the real estate, he is entitled to any increase in value that may accrue, and
must bear the risk of loss or damage. See 39 CYC. 1304, 1641. And he may in-
sure his interest. See 19 COC. 584.
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tion contract, but is a binding bilateral contract for the sale of
real estate.7 It is specifically enforceable in equity," and immediate-
ly vests in the former optionee an equitable interest in the land
which descends to his heirs at law if he dies intestate.' But before
the option is exercised, the optionee gets no interest in the real
estate to which the option contract relates.10
If the Rule against Perpetuities is strictly a rule of property
law, and not of contract law, then it seems that it
should not apply to unexercised option contracts." And,
after the right of election has been exercised, the
rule is no longer concerned with the transaction, for the reason
that upon election ipso facto the equitable title vests in the op-
tionee, 2 and the Rule does not affect vested estates.' s It seems,
therefore, that if the Rule against Perpetuities is to be applied to
option contracts, it must reach them on the ground that it affects
contracts, or at least some kinds of contracts, as well as interests
in property.
The English courts seem to be inconsistent in applying the Rule
to option contracts. In the case of Worthing Corporation v. Heath-
er, 1 although the court held that the option contract could not be
specifically enforced, because it violated the Rule against Perpetui-
ties, nevertheless it allowed the optionee to recover damages for its
breach, stating that the Rule does not apply to contract rights.
Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622. 97 S. E. 654. See 2 A. L. R. 631.
s Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738, 11 S. E. 220; Slattery v. Gross, 96
Ore. 554, 187 Pac. 300. See Donnally v. Parker, 5 W. Va. 301, 324, See also 6
L. R. A. (N. S.) 403; 36 CYc. 552. And see JAMES, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 514.
V. Chandler, 179 Ia. 304, 161 N. W. 434. See JAMEs, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 872.
9 Sewell v. Underhill, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 92, 111 N. Y. Supp. 85; Ingraham
If the right of election is not exercised until after the optionee's death, if he dies
intestate the land does not descend to the heirs, but the next-of-kin acquire his
rights under the option contract. See L. R. A. 1917D, 719. And if the optionee
elects to purchase after the optionor's death intestate, the land having descended
to the optionor's heir, the heir, and not the personal representatives of the oP.
tionor, gets the purchase money. Smith v. Lowenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N. E.
159. See L. R. A. 1916F, 358. Also, while there is a conflict of authority, it
seems that the better view is that 'election to purchase under such a contract does
not relate back to the date of the option contract. Rockland-Rockport Lime Co.
v. Ieary, 203 N. Y. 469. 97 N. E. 43; Smith v. Lowenstein, infra; Adams v. Pea-
body Coal Co., 230 Ill. 469, 82 N. I. 645. See L. R. A. 1916F, 358; L. R. A.
1917D, 719. Contra, Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. Jr., 591. It is submitted that
those cases which hold that the optionee of an unexercised option contract for the
purchase of real estate has an insurable interest in it are unsound. See L. R. A.
1918A, 393. See also JAMES, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 872.
10 See Note 5, supra.
11 This is the argument of Prof. John R. Rood, "Options and the Rule Against
Perpetuities," C. & Com. 835.
Is Smith v. Lowenstein, supra. See Donnally v. Parker, 5 W. Va. 301, 324. See
also JAMES, OPTION CONTRACTS, §514.
Is Armstrong v. Barber, 289, 88 N. E. 246. In this respect it is submitted that
Winsor v. Mills, supra, is inaccurate. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PPRPETU1TIMSI
275a.
Iu [1906] 2 Ch. 532. 0t. Woodall v. Clinton, [1905] 2 Oh. 257.
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The court, in that case, seems to have failed to differentiate between
the true option contract and the contract to purchase land which
grew out of it. It was in that case that the court made the state-
fment that an option to purchase real estate creates an equitable
interest therein. 1'
The American courts, it is submitted, have adopted the proper
view. In a recent case,16 the Massachusetts court refused to en-
force specifically the performance of a contract giving the op-
tionee an election to purchase real estate at any time within twen-
ty-five years; and, further, the court denied the optionee the right
to recover common-law damages for the breach of the contract, ex-
pressly repudiating the doctrine of Worthing Corporation v.
Heather in this respect. The ground on which the court rests its
holding in that case is that the option contract violates the spirit
of the Rule against Perpetuities,'" and, being void in equity, is al-
so void at law. The New Jersey court has also recently reached
the conclusion that the Rule against Perpetuities applies to con-
tract rights as well as to contingent interests in property. 8  It
is submitted that this is the proper view. No cogent reason is seen
why, if a contract relating to land is not specifically enforceable
in equity, a law court ought to allow damages for its breach. The
contract should be considered either valid or void, not void in one
court and valid in another. These contracts should be held void
not because they create interests of any kind in the land to which
they relate, but because they violate the spirit of the Rule. 9
-W. F. K.
EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONs-REsTRICTIONS AS TO THE USE OF
LAND-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-The West Virginia Supreme Court
in two recent decisions' has recognized the validity of certain
agreements creating equitable restrictions upon the use of land.
In both instances these agreements were contained in the deeds
15 [1906] 2 Ch. 532, 536. And see note 5, supra.16 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co.. 128 N. E. 1"77 (Mass. 1920).
27 For an excellent statement of the spirit of the Rule, see the article by Ed-
win H. Abbot, Jr., "Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuitles," 27 YALE L. J." 885.
Professor Kales says that the option contract. for the purchase of real estate makes
the optionee the dominus of the land, and Is objectionable for that reason. See
KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 665.
-" Canda v. Canda, 113 At]. 503 (N. J. Ch. 1920). But clearly it does not
apply to all contract rights. See McKenzie v. Chllders, 43 Ch. Div. 265, 279. See
also GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §329.
10 See note 17. supra.
I Cole v. Seamons, 104 S. E. 747 (W. Va. 1921) ;Withers v. Ward, 86 W. Va.
558, 104 S E. 96 (1920).
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